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As far as I can tell, Sanford Kadish coined the term 
“overcriminalization” in a 1962 article in the Harvard Law Review, where 
he noted the phenomenon of “criminal statutes which seem deliberately to 
overcriminalize, in the sense of encompassing conduct not the target of 
legislative concern.”1  After listing a few examples of overcriminalization, 
such as overly broad bans on gambling and strict liability statutes, Professor 
Kadish mentioned that these laws “raise basic issues of a morally 
acceptable criminal code,” insofar as they “purport to bring within the 
condemnation of the criminal statute kinds of activities whose moral 
neutrality, if not innocence, is widely recognized.”2  He was not the first 
prominent scholar to articulate the basic problem, however.
3
  A few years 
earlier, for instance, Francis Allen had noted “the sheer bulk of penal 
regulations,” “the accelerating rate at which these accretions to the criminal 
law have occurred,” and “the remarkable range of human activities now 
subject to the threat of criminal sanctions.”4  Indeed, the breadth of penal 
 
* Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School 
of Law. 
1 Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 
75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962). 
2 Id. at 910. 
3 At the turn of the previous century, Roscoe Pound noted “the crude and unorganized 
character of American legislation in a period when the growing point of law has drifted to 
legislation.”  Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration 
of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 748 (1906).  He would later point out that, “of one hundred 
thousand persons arrested in Chicago in 1912, more than one half were held for violation of 
legal precepts which did not exist twenty-five years before.”  ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 23 (1930). 
4 Francis A. Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of “Socializing” 
Criminal Justice, 32 SOC. SERV. REV. 107, 108 (1958). 
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codes and overloading of criminal justice systems were common themes of 
reform efforts throughout the twentieth century.
5
 
Nonetheless, Professor Kadish provided a single word that crystalized 
the phenomenon—hardly a small accomplishment in a legal and political 
culture often affected by labels.  In the coming years, Kadish and his 
contemporaries would describe various manifestations and repercussions of 
overcriminalization in the state and federal systems.
6
  The use of criminal 
law to enforce public standards of private morality, as in the case of drug 
offenses, failed to suppress either supply or demand.  Instead, drug 
criminalization increased black-market profits and related offenses, required 
police to engage in devious practices due to the covert and consensual 
nature of the narcotics trade, and diverted limited resources from the 
enforcement and adjudication of serious harms.
7
  As for regulatory offenses, 
much of the conduct in question closely resembled business behavior that 
was “not only socially acceptable, but affirmatively desirable” in an 
economic system premised on free enterprise.
8
  In these situations, “the 
stigma of moral reprehensibility” did not intuitively attach to the regulated 
behavior.
9
  Rather, each addition of morally neutral conduct to the penal 
code further diluted the normative force of the criminal sanction. 
Professor Kadish warned that, “until these problems of 
overcriminalization are systematically examined and effectively dealt with, 
some of the most besetting problems of criminal-law administration are 
bound to continue.”10  His prognosis remains as true today as when he 
offered it in 1967.  As my contribution to this Symposium, I will suggest 
another way of looking at overcriminalization that reconceptualizes the 
problem and offers a second-best approach to dealing with the 
phenomenon’s most troubling expressions.  Regardless of any prescriptive 
possibilities, maybe the neologism itself, like the one coined by Professor 
 
5 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: 
American Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597 
(2011). 
6 See Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in 
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 432 (1963) [hereinafter Kadish, 
Some Observations]; Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 158 (1967) [hereinafter Kadish, Crisis of 
Overcriminalization]; see also NORVAL MORRIS & GORDON HAWKINS, THE HONEST 
POLITICIAN’S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL SANCTION 250–366 (1969); Frank J. Remington, The Limits and Possibilities of 
the Criminal Law, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 865, 865 (1968). 
7 See Kadish, Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 6, at 163–65. 
8 Kadish, Some Observations, supra note 6, at 436. 
9 Id. at 425–26. 
10 Kadish, Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 6, at 158. 
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Kadish a half-century ago, might help people rethink the status quo.  Before 
considering the basic idea—what I call “prosecutorial decriminalization”—
the following provides some background on overcriminalization and the 
prospects for change. 
II. REFORM PROSPECTS 
On occasion, Professor Kadish was called upon to respond to those 
who rejected the arguments against overcriminalization as being 
theoretically unprincipled or, conversely, uselessly abstract.
11
  Yet today, 
decades after he introduced the phrase into the legal lexicon, 
overcriminalization is acknowledged as a serious problem—not only by 
academics, but also by eminent jurists, former high-ranking government 
officials, and organizations from across the political spectrum
12—inspiring 
books, law review symposia, and congressional hearings.
13
  The 
phenomenon can be seen as encompassing an assortment of issues, 
including: 
 offenses deficient in clearly harmful wrongdoing (e.g., vice 
crimes and many non-larcenous economic offenses); 
 duplicative penal provisions and novel crimes already well 
covered by existing law (e.g., carjacking);  
 statutes passed without genuine jurisdictional authority (e.g., 
federal offenses with specious links to interstate commerce);  
 doctrines that can expand liability to those who hardly seem 
blameworthy (e.g., strict liability and vicarious liability); and  
 harsh punishments that bear no necessary relationship to the 
harm caused or threatened by the offense and the 
 
11 See Sanford H. Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 
1247, 1249 (1995) [hereinafter Kadish, Folly of Overfederalization]; Sanford H. Kadish, 
More on Overcriminalization: A Reply to Professor Junker, 19 UCLA L. REV. 719, 719 
(1972). 
12 See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Ensnared, 
WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A1; Adam Liptak, Right and Left Join to Take On U.S. in 
Criminal Justice Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2009, at A1. 
13 See, e.g., Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing 
Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Over-Criminalization of Conduct/Over-
Federalization of Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); GO DIRECTLY TO 
JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (Gene Healy ed., 2004); DOUGLAS 
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008); IN THE NAME OF 
JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE “THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW” (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009); Symposium, Overcriminalization 2.0: Developing 
Consensus Solutions, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 565 (2011); Symposium, Overcriminalization: 
The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005). 
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This understanding of overcriminalization, shared in whole or in part 
by those who seek to contain or reverse the phenomenon, is indicative of a 
newfound appreciation for the legitimate ends of criminal law.  With a 
convergence of opinion, the discussion inevitably turns to a search for 
answers—and just as inevitably, two solutions have been offered by 
scholars and reformers.  The first option would be for lawmakers to address 
overcriminalization by trimming the penal code, with a scalpel in some 
places and a hatchet in others.  This approach seems preferable to all others, 
given that a legislature possesses the most straightforward means to deal 
with the problem.  Besides, lawmakers are the ones who created the mess to 
begin with, by continually expanding the reach of criminal justice systems, 
enacting new crimes, providing for harsher punishments, and broadening 
culpability principles, often in the absence of deontological or empirical 
justification and without regard for statutory redundancy or jurisdictional 
limitations.  A variation on this theme calls for the depoliticization of at 
least the initial steps of criminal lawmaking by shifting responsibility for 
defining crimes and setting punishments in the first instance from 
lawmakers to non-political criminal justice experts.
15
 
The second option involves the imposition of the judiciary as a check 
on overcriminalization.  Over the years, this approach has been advocated 
by a number of leading scholars, each offering his or her own theory of 
judicial review.  Among others, the late, great William Stuntz considered 
the potential of constitutionalizing substantive criminal law—through a 
minimum mens rea requirement, for example, and revitalized rules of 
desuetude and notice—all as a means to limit the power of lawmakers to 
ban and punish conduct.
16
  In a subsequent article, Professor Stuntz 
suggested a prerequisite of regularized enforcement, where the government 
would have to show that a sufficient number of similarly situated 
defendants had been convicted of the crime charged against the accused, 
and that a minimum number of factually analogous cases resulted in 
 
14 See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704–17 
(2005) [hereinafter Overcriminalization Phenomenon]. 
15 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 582–87 (2001) [hereinafter Pathological Politics].  In his article, Professor Stuntz was 
not advocating the depoliticization approach.  Indeed, he suggests that “expert-driven 
criminal law is a practical impossibility.”  Id. at 585. 
16 See id. at 587–98; William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 
7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 31–38 (1996); see also Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a 
Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 530–70 (2004); Claire 
Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 358–93 (2000). 
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sentences as severe as the one imposed in the case at bar.
17
  Such proposals 
make a great deal of sense in light of the fundamental role of the judiciary 
as a countermajoritarian safeguard against political excesses.
18
 
Unfortunately, neither of these overarching solutions has had much 
traction, due in large part to the dysfunctional political process that expands 
but never contracts the criminal justice system.  In 1995, Professor Kadish 
summed up the typical cycle of “creeping and foolish” overcriminalization: 
Some dramatic crimes or series of crimes are given conspicuous media coverage, 
producing what is perceived, and often is, widespread public anxiety.  Seeking to 
make political hay, some legislator proposes a new law to make this or that a major 
felony or to raise the penalty or otherwise tighten the screws.  Since other legislators 
know well that no one can lose voter popularity for seeming to be tough on crime, the 
legislation sails through in a breeze.  That the chances of the legislation working to 
reduce crime are exceedingly low, and in some cases the chances of it doing harm are 
very high, scarcely seems to be a relevant issue.
19
 
In this sadly familiar account of criminal justice politics
20—one which 
is consistent with the sociological theory of “moral panics,” the measured 
impact of sensational crime stories, and the collapse of the harm principle 
as a legislative limit
21—new offenses and harsher punishments become 
means to placate constituents and make fodder for reelection campaigns.  
There is also a “deeper politics, a politics of institutional competition and 
cooperation,” Professor Stuntz argued, that “always pushes toward broader 
liability rules, and toward harsher sentences as well.”22  Lawmakers have an 
incentive to take symbolic stands through criminal law, and law enforcers 
have an interest in disposing of cases and obtaining convictions.  All of this 
can be achieved by restricting more behavior (and restricting it in more 
ways) and increasing sentences, which leads to more and cheaper 
convictions via plea bargaining.  Together, lawmakers and law enforcers 
have a powerful predisposition toward overcriminalization. 
For its part, the third branch has done virtually nothing to curb the 
phenomenon, having all but abandoned the field of constitutional criminal 
 
17 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 781, 838–43 (2006) [hereinafter Political Constitution]. 
18 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16–17, 34–35 (1996); Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 
48 DUKE L.J. 787, 824 (1999). 
19 Kadish, Folly of Overfederalization, supra note 11, at 1248–49. 
20 See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 783 (2012). 
21 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 110 (1999); Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 81–86 (2009). 
22 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 15, at 510. 
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law.  Outside of a few areas—most notably, freedom of expression, 
procreative rights, and the death penalty—the courts have been hesitant to 
limit lawmakers in their enactment of crimes and punishments.  At its 
essence, adjudication in the United States is a conservative endeavor, 
constrained by notions of stare decisis and the obligation to justify 
deviations from past precedent.
23
  Perhaps more than its co-equals, the 
judiciary is cognizant of its own institutional limitations.
24
  The courts are 
also “haunted” by the “ghost of Lochner”25 and thus careful to avoid the 
semblance of a super-legislature.  As a practical matter, judicial reticence to 
counter overcriminalization may be partially attributed to the lack of clear-
cut standards.  For instance, at what point does a term of imprisonment 
become “cruel and unusual”?26  Whatever the reason, the courts are unlikely 
to be a significant source of criminal law reform. 
All hope is not lost, however.  When the seemingly irresistible force of 
the new reform coalition meets the apparently immoveable object of 
pathological politics, something must give.  With any luck, this faux 
paradox will be resolved by legislative action that either directly or 
indirectly tackles the problems of overcriminalization.  The former might be 
foreshadowed by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
27
 which eliminated the 
mandatory five-year sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine—the 
first time a federal mandatory minimum had been repealed since the Nixon 
Administration
28—while also reducing the sentencing disparity between 
crack and powder cocaine. 
As for indirect reform, Senator Jim Webb introduced legislation to 
create a National Criminal Justice Commission.  This bipartisan body 
would 
undertake a comprehensive review of the criminal justice system, make findings 
related to current Federal and State criminal justice policies and practices, and make 
reform recommendations for the President, Congress, and State governments to 
improve public safety, cost-effectiveness, overall prison administration, and fairness 




23 See, e.g., Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 17, at 846. 
24 Cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES ch. 2 (4th 
ed. 2011) (discussing limits on federal judicial power). 
25 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905); see, e.g., Robert C. Post, 
Lecture, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. 
REV. 1489, 1494 (1998). 
26 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
27 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. 
28 See, e.g., Molly M. Gill, Correcting Course: Lessons from the 1970 Repeal of 
Mandatory Minimums, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 55, 55 (2008). 
29 National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009, S. 714, 111th Cong. § 4. 
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By all appearances, the proposed task force would be an excellent vehicle to 
examine overcriminalization and to suggest meaningful reforms.  Given the 
likely stature of the commission’s membership and the backing of 
numerous organizations,
30
 the commission might provide the type of 
political cover needed for lawmakers to support the recommendations. 
To be clear, I am optimistic, not quixotic.  The entirely laudable Webb 
Commission has been twice blocked by lawmakers and may well die when 
its namesake leaves the Senate at year’s end.  More generally, the history of 
criminal justice commissions has been a mixed bag, with some well-known 
achievements but just as many flops.
31
  As for legislative reform, the Fair 
Sentencing Act represents an important but small step.  Further reform 
efforts still face the longstanding political hurdles discussed above, while at 
the same time institutional structures and political incentives will continue 
the pressure for more crimes and harsher punishments.
32
  Recent events 
may augur certain well-crafted, targeted legislative modifications, which 
might set the stage for greater reforms.
33
  But the political environment does 
not appear conducive to rapid, wholesale change to criminal law—at least 
not yet. 
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
What is to be done in the meantime, during the interregnum between 
our overcriminalized present and a hopefully more reasonable future?  
Here, I would like to suggest another way of looking at overcriminalization.  
The relevant concept, “prosecutorial decriminalization,” has both positive 
and normative aspects.  The descriptive claim is that prosecutors have the 
power to decriminalize conduct and, in fact, they are already doing it en 
masse.  The prescriptive claim is that this power, when exercised openly 
and pursuant to public reason, can ameliorate some of the problems of 
overcriminalization. 
The descriptive argument is straightforward—and, I think, relatively 
uncontroversial—involving just a few moves.  First, the prosecutorial 
 
30 See Letter from S. 714 Coalition Supporters to Senator Jim Webb (Sept. 15, 2010),  
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/38089190/S-714-Coalition-Supporters. 
31 See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 730–31. 
32 See, e.g., Legislative Update, OVERCRIMINALIZED.COM, http://overcriminalized.com/
Legislation.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (describing a Heritage Foundation project 
providing “details, status, and basic commentary on legislation pending in Congress that 
could perpetuate the dangerous trend of criminalizing more and more conduct that is socially 
and economically beneficial and of punishing Americans for acts they commit without 
criminal intent”). 
33 Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4 
(2010). 
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function is steeped in discretion, which, as used here, simply means the 
power to choose between two or more courses of conduct.
34
  Discretion is a 
“residual concept,” as James Vorenberg suggested, “the room left for 
subjective judgment” after taking into consideration the applicable 
constraints, most notably, statutes and court decisions.
35
  Or to use Ronald 
Dworkin’s famous simile, discretion is “like the hole of a doughnut,” which 
“does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of 
restriction.”36 
In the present context, when the legislature declares certain behavior 
criminal and attaches a particular punishment, prosecutors exercise virtually 
limitless discretion to administer the relevant code section.
37
  The courts 
will not demand that charges be leveled; nor will they upset a prosecutor’s 
decision to bring charges;
38
 nor are judges likely to hinder plea negotiations 
and the concomitant agreements.
39
  As then-Judge Warren Burger opined, 
“Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the 
Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute 
criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to 
dismiss a proceeding once brought.”40  The primary legal checks are the 
burdens of proof to charge and convict—respectively, probable cause and 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt
41—along with the obligations of pretrial 




Even in a world without overcriminalization, one might expect that the 
scope of prosecutorial discretion would be substantial.  The boundaries of 
language and foresight prevent a legislature from formulating rules in every 
law enforcement scenario.  For this reason, lawmakers may prefer general 
terms that capture broad swaths of conduct, ensuring that wrongdoers do 
 
34 See, e.g., Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1133 (2000).  See 
generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). 
35 James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE 
L.J. 651, 654; see also Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The 
Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1960); Peter Westen, 
The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 
604, 642 (1983). 
36 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977). 
37 Except, as mentioned previously, when a statute touches on topics such as speech and 
procreation.  See supra text accompanying notes 23–26. 
38 See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1413, 1418 nn.15–16 (2010). 
39 Id. at 1418 n.17. 
40 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
41 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 364 (1970). 
42 See Luna & Wade, supra note 38, at 1418 n.18. 
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not escape punishment through an inadvertent loophole.  The necessity of 
political compromise also lends itself to statutory imprecision, freeing 
lawmakers from having to make hard decisions that could upset voters or 
interest groups.
43
  Moreover, vague statutes may garner more votes and take 
less time to navigate the legislative process, while still placating the 
public’s desire for action.44 
In the current reality of grotesque overcriminalization, however, 
prosecutorial discretion is awe-inspiring.  Consider the power wielded by 
federal prosecutors as a result of the approximately 4,500 provisions that 
are punishable as crimes,
45
 with the largest portion enacted after Professor 
Kadish first warned of overcriminalization.
46
  In effect, the federal 
government has arrogated to itself a general police power to enact virtually 
any offense, creating an enormous criminal code—if you can call it a 
“code”—filled with repetitive and overlapping statutes, covering behavior 
already well covered by state law,
47




43 Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 5, 10 (1997). 
44 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 469, 474–75 (1996); Kahan, supra note 43, at 9–11. 
45 See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., HERITAGE FOUND., REVISITING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF 
FEDERAL CRIMES (2008), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/
pdf/lm26.pdf.  Actually, the number is probably much larger, due to the thousands of 
regulations that do not appear in federal statutes yet carry the possibility of criminal 
penalties.  See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Criminal Code Is Overgrown, Legal 
Experts Tell Panel, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2011, at A8 (quoting former U.S. Attorney 
General Edwin Meese); see also Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal Criminal 
Laws, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A10.  Apparently, the Congressional Research Service 
gave up an attempt to calculate the amount of separate federal crimes on the books.  Rough 
Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 26, 
28.  The Justice Department has acknowledged that the number cannot be quantified.  Fields 
& Emshwiller, supra note 12 (citing Justice Department spokeswoman). 
46 See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 n.9 (1998) (revealing “startling fact” that “[m]ore than 
40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 
1970,” and noting that “[m]uch, though not all, of this surge has occurred in the last two 
decades”). 
47 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1090–1103 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding, inter alia, a federal felony indictment for violation of Utah’s commercial bribery 
statute, a misdemeanor under state law). 
48 See, e.g., PAUL ROSENZWEIG, HERITAGE FOUND., THE OVER-CRIMINALIZATION OF 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT (2003), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/
2003/pdf/lm7.pdf. 
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and extending federal jurisdiction to all kinds of deception and wrongdoing 
across the nation and around the globe.
49
 
Although perhaps not as virulent and prone to less criticism,
50
 
overcriminalization has also taken place at the state level.  For instance, 
Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill point to the Illinois Criminal Code—
which is now a dozen times longer than the original code—as a case in 
point on the “accelerating degradation” of American criminal codes through 
enactment of new offenses, expansion of existing crimes, and increases in 
punishment.
51
  Rather than employing the power to criminalize for socially 
beneficial purposes, most state legislatures have become “offense 
factories.”52 
As a result, it is not altogether hyperbolic to say that everyone is a 
criminal (or at least a potential scofflaw).  In 2005, I suggested that 
American society may be approaching a watershed point of criminal law, 
what one book aptly titled “the criminalization of almost everything.”53  A 
few years earlier, Professor Stuntz had made a similar prediction that, 
absent major changes, “we are likely to come ever closer to a world in 
which the law on the books makes everyone a felon.”54  The basic concern 
actually traces back several decades.  Then-U.S. Attorney General Robert 
Jackson observed in 1940, “With the law books filled with a great 
assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a 
technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone.”55  In the new 
millennium, the we’re-all-criminals idea is truer than ever, whether the 
public recognizes it or not.  “[M]ost people think of criminals as bad 
 
49 See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 709–10.  But see 
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010) (limiting the scope of “honest 
services” fraud). 
50 As compared to the federal government, the states at least possess a constitutionally 
legitimate police power.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566–67 (1995). 
51 Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the 
States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 172 (2003); Paul H. Robinson & 
Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635–38 (2005).  Professor Stuntz made similar findings with regard to 
the criminal codes of Massachusetts and Virginia.  Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 
15, at 514.  But see, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 223, 227–28 (2007). 
52 Robinson & Cahill, supra note 51, at 634. 
53 See Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 746 (referring to GO 
DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 15). 
54 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 15, at 511. 
55 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
3, 5 (1940). 
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people, who deserve punishment,” Judge Alex Kozinski remarked, “while 
not realizing that they are criminals themselves.”56 
Prosecutorial discretion thus exists within a Dworkinian doughnut that 
encircles us all.  In wielding this discretion, prosecutors are the most 
powerful actors in the criminal justice system.  They decide whether to 
accept or decline a case, and, on occasion, whether an individual should be 
arrested in the first place; they select what crimes should be charged and the 
number of counts; they choose whether to engage in plea negotiations and 
the terms of an acceptable agreement; they determine all aspects of pretrial 
and trial strategy; and in many cases, they essentially decide the punishment 
that will be imposed upon conviction.  As such, the prosecutor is the 
criminal justice system, in effect making the law, enforcing it against the 
accused, adjudicating his guilt, and determining the punishment.
57
 
This bears repeating.  Prosecutors not only enforce the criminal code 
in the traditional sense, but they also effectively make law and judge cases 
through their discretionary decisions.  Which brings me to the ultimate 
point: In an overcriminalized world, prosecutors are already decriminalizing 
conduct through their discretionary decisionmaking—as a matter of fact, 
they seem to have no other choice but to do so.  In large district attorneys’ 
offices, each prosecutor can have a caseload of 150 felonies per year or 
more; a misdemeanor caseload may be many times larger, sometimes 
exceeding a thousand cases per year.
58
   
Needless to say, there is not enough time and resources, either in 
prosecutors’ offices or in courtrooms, to try all of these cases.  As a rule of 
thumb, 25%–50% of all cases referred to prosecutors are declined for 
prosecution.
59
  Although many of these cases are dismissed outright, some 
 
56 Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE 
NAME OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 44; see also Michelle Alexander, I’m a Criminal and So 
Are You, CNN.COM (May 18, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-18/opinion/
alexander.who.am.i_1_law-abiding-felons-criminal?_s=PM:OPINION. 
57 See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Preface, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE at xi, xi (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2012). 
58 See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How 
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 
270–74 (2011); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.10(c) (3d ed. 
& Supp. 2011).  But see Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem 
of Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 143–45 (2011) 
(questioning prosecutorial caseload numbers). 
59 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 29, 75 (2002).  The declination rate varies widely across jurisdictions and among crime 
categories; to the extent the information is made public, the reasons for declining cases vary 
widely as well.  See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1717–20 (2010); Marc L. Miller & 
Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 130–31 (2008); Michael Edmund 
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may involve pretrial diversion, where charges are dismissed only after the 
suspect performs some task or participates in a program.
60
  Either way, the 
cases are removed from the criminal justice system.  Of the cases that do 
proceed further into the criminal process, more than 90% are resolved by 
plea bargain, which typically involves a defendant pleading guilty in 
exchange for reduced charges or a lesser punishment.
61
 
To be sure, a prosecutor might decline a case because of insufficient 
proof of a suspect’s guilt or the existence of some legal barrier to 
conviction, such as a constitutional violation by the police.  But in other 
cases, prosecutors abstain from filing charges despite the likelihood of 
obtaining convictions.
62
  As for plea bargaining, it is true that the eventual 
crime of conviction and sentence under a given agreement may reflect a 
more just assessment of the defendant’s culpability.  Still, most plea 
bargains result in defendants being convicted of less serious offenses and 
receiving reduced punishments than they might otherwise receive under the 
law. 
In these situations, prosecutors are exercising the fullest expression of 
their discretion.  By declining a case, the prosecutor is refusing to apply the 
penal code to a given suspect.  By plea bargaining, the prosecutor is 
refusing to apply the most serious crime and the toughest punishment 
otherwise applicable to a given defendant.  In effect, these prosecutors are 
engaged in decriminalization.  This will strike some as odd, perhaps a 
strange way of describing or aggregating prosecutorial behavior.  
Nonetheless, it carries the earmarks of decriminalization, such as removing 
or reducing the criminal classification or status of conduct, for instance, or 
repealing a strict ban on certain behavior while keeping it under some type 
of regulation.
63
  Through their discretionary decisionmaking, prosecutors 
are treating some conduct as non-criminal and handling other conduct as 
 
O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of 
Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2004); Michael Edmund O’Neill, 
When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 221, 252 (2003); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their 
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758 (2003). 
60 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 58, at § 13.1(d). 
61 See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN 
STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009), available at http:bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.35.2009 (2010), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t5352009.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2012); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 67 (2004), available at 
http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf.  
62 Wright & Miller, supra note 59, at 153. 
63 See, e.g., Decriminalize Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/decriminalize (last visited Nov. 23, 2012). 
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not quite as criminal as it could be—in other words, prosecutorial 
decriminalization. 
IV. COVERT DECRIMINALIZATION 
This manner of decriminalization raises all sorts of problems.  The 
plea-bargaining process is infamously coercive, due in large part to 
overcriminalization and, in particular, the promulgation of unforgiving 
sentencing provisions, often coming in the form of mandatory minimums.  
If the defendant refuses to plead guilty and waive his constitutional rights, a 
“trial tax” is exacted upon conviction: a sometimes grossly excessive 
penalty for exercising his rights.
64
  Not surprisingly, most defendants take 
the plea even when they might have strong culpability defenses or 
arguments in mitigation. 
More generally, prosecutorial decriminalization tends to be opaque, a 
secret law formed by the accumulation of unwritten policies, office 
customs, and daily practices.  In a sense, it is the latent administrative law 
of criminal prosecution that helps account for the many actions that cannot 
be explained by reference to penal codes alone.  Unlike real administrative 
law, however, most prosecutorial decriminalization occurs without the 
possibility of public notice and comment.  Instead, it is only evident to other 
repeat players of criminal justice—police officers, defense attorneys, and 
judges—who come to realize the patterns of case declinations and the 
“going rate” for plea bargains.65  Those most directly affected by 
prosecutorial decriminalization, criminal suspects and defendants, remain 
largely oblivious.  But so is everyone else.  If the common citizen is 
unaware that we are all criminals in an overcriminalized nation, he certainly 
will not recognize that prosecutors are decriminalizing conduct in bulk. 
Because its existence and extent are unknown, prosecutorial 
decriminalization is not amenable to the traditional mechanisms of change 
in a representative democracy.  Legislators and elected chief prosecutors
66
 
serve as professional delegates of a given constituency.  For representative 
democracy to work—that is, for the will of the people to be served by its 
delegates—lawmakers and chief law enforcers must be accessible to the 
citizenry, responsive to popular demands, and accountable for their 
decisions.  Without these elements, “it could well be impossible to make a 
 
64 See, e.g., STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 38, 83 (2005). 
65 See, e.g., Allison O. Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1594 
(2011). 
66 Even unelected chief prosecutors (e.g., U.S. Attorneys) are answerable to an executive 
officer who is subject to the ballot box (e.g., the President). 
798 ERIK LUNA [Vol. 102 
rational case that a system is democratic.”67  In the present context, elected 
officials will not be held accountable for their role in prosecutorial 
decriminalization—whether it be overcriminalizing the system to begin 
with or decriminalizing conduct in turn—precisely because the public is not 
fully aware of the pertinent decisions and therefore cannot be expected to 
participate in meaningful discourse and, if necessary, to demand 
government reform. 
The secret law of prosecutorial decriminalization is not only hard to 
square with a decent model of representative democracy, it also violates a 
widely cited interpretation of the rule of law.
68
  In articulating what he 
called the “inner morality of law,”69 Lon Fuller laid out the basic 
requirements for a legal command to be worthy of public fidelity rather than 
being the imposition of arbitrary power.  Specifically, this conception of the 
rule of law embraced eight principles: (1) a law should be expressed in 
general terms; (2) it should be available to affected parties; (3) it should be 
prospective rather than retroactive; (4) it should be clear and 
understandable; (5) it should not produce contradictory commands; (6) it 
should not require the impossible; (7) it should not frequently change; and 
(8) it should be congruent with its enforcement.
70
 
The complete failure of any of these principles “does not simply result 
in a bad system of law,” Professor Fuller contended, but “it results in 
something that is not properly called a legal system at all.”71  Today’s 
overcriminalized justice systems and the reality of covert decriminalization 
violate most of these principles.  Of course, a system that makes everyone a 
criminal might rightly be seen as requiring the impossible.  In addition, 
much of what has been described as prosecutorial decriminalization is 
neither available to affected parties nor understood by the general public.  
Most obviously, the current scheme generates a troublesome incongruence 
 
67 Carl F. Pinkele, Discretion Fits Democracy: An Advocate’s Argument, in DISCRETION, 
JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY: A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (Carl F. Pinkele & William C. 
Louthan eds., 1985). 
68 The rule of law is an endlessly contested idea, one that philosophers and legal scholars 
alike describe as “promiscuous” in its use, Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 211 (1979), “one of the most 
elusive concepts in the lexicon of jurisprudence,” Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, 
Introduction: Prospects for the Rule of Law, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 427, 428 (1991), and “less 
clear today than ever before,” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1997). 
69 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (1969).  See generally Erik Luna, 
Cuban Criminal Justice and the Ideal of Good Governance, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 529, 583–95 (2004) (offering a detailed discussion of the rule of law). 
70 See FULLER, supra note 69, at 39; see also Fallon, supra note 68, at 8–9 n.27 (offering 
similar elements for the rule of law and stating that they are consistent with Fuller’s criteria). 
71 FULLER, supra note 69, at 39. 
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between the formal law and its actual administration.  “It may not be 
impossible for a man to obey a rule that is disregarded by those charged 
with its administration,” argued Fuller, “but at some point obedience 
becomes futile—as futile, in fact, as casting a vote that will never be 
counted.”72 
In its clandestine form, prosecutorial decriminalization is not liable to 
behavior-shaping rules or after-the-fact review that might help prevent 
frequent changes in the effective law and disparate outcomes across cases.  
Rather, it can license ad hoc decisionmaking that results in otherwise 
similarly situated individuals receiving vastly different consequences.  A 
criminal law adhocracy is bad enough, but at times the ensuing disparities 
can have uncomfortable associations with race and ethnicity.
73
  Certainly, 
there might be a correlation without causation,
74
 and even causal 
relationships may stem from something other than the classic understanding 
of prejudice.
75
  But appearances matter in criminal law enforcement, and 
effect may well be taken as intent.  The impression if not reality of 
capricious decisionmaking and invidious discrimination necessarily 
challenges the perceived fairness of the law and its enforcement, 
undermining the principal basis for compliance.
76
 
Nonetheless, arguments might be made in favor of prosecutorial 
decriminalization, despite the fact people are unaware of its existence or, 
instead, precisely because the public is largely oblivious.  As mentioned, 
law enforcement has a stake in overcriminalization.  The expansion of 
criminal liability makes it easier to prosecute a course of conduct, and 
increased sentences provide defendants a powerful inducement to enter plea 
agreements.
77
  This might seem perfectly acceptable when it leads to the 
capture of a dangerous criminal (e.g., the initial arrest of Timothy McVeigh 
 
72 Id. 
73 See, e.g., John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-McCleskey 
Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1779 (1998). 
74 Cf. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1757 (1998). 
75 See, e.g., Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, 
Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531, 
536 (1997); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1016, 1022, 1025 (1988). 
76 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Paul H. Robinson 
& John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997). 
77 See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 723–24; Stuntz, 
supra note 15, at 519–20, 531.  As a former Justice Department official noted, “it is not 
surprising that the federal agency charged with preventing, solving, and punishing federal 
crimes is not aggressively attempting to shrink the federal code.”  RACHEL BRAND, HERITAGE 
FOUND., MAKING IT A FEDERAL CASE: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE PRESSURES TO FEDERALIZE 
CRIME 1–2 (2008); see also United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 
2004). 
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for a traffic offense), when it provides a ploy to convict the otherwise 
invulnerable kingpin (e.g., the prosecution of Al Capone for tax violations), 
or when prosecutorial decriminalization helps generate information about a 
criminal enterprise (e.g., the lure for an insider to “flip”). 
Some might argue that overcriminalization complemented by 
prosecutorial decriminalization enhances general deterrence by creating an 
“acoustic separation” of sorts.78  The public and, in particular, would-be 
criminals recognize the existence of at least some areas of 
overcriminalization, such as broad bans and harsh punishments for drug 
offenses.  But average citizens may not know about prosecutorial 
decriminalization, which is understood only by the repeat players of 
criminal justice.  Because most individuals hear the conduct rule of full 
criminalization and not the decision rule of prosecutorial decriminalization, 
some people might be deterred from crime that they otherwise would have 
committed.
79
   
Although these arguments may not be inherently unsound, it does 
seem to me that they are inadequate to outweigh the virtues of government 
transparency and democratic accountability.  The pretexts provided by 
overcriminalization allow law enforcement to skirt criminal procedure 
guarantees, almost always to the detriment of minorities and the 
underclass.
80
  Pretextual prosecutions may also send “muddied signals” 
about crime and its enforcement, providing inaccurate information to 
prospective offenders, government bodies, and the public at large.
81
  
Moreover, acts of decriminalization may at times have less to do with 
 
78 See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (employing the term “acoustic 
separation” to the distinction between conduct rules and decisions rules in criminal law); 
Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, 
Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (same for criminal procedure). 
79 In some contexts, people might even favor a scheme of low-visibility decisionmaking 
in criminal justice.  With regard to sentencing reform, for instance, Stephen Schulhofer once 
asked whether it is “inevitably wise to expose the problems and demand a political solution 
when the questions mix value-laden elements with empirical assessments that the public is 
unlikely to appreciate; when public opinion in any event is volatile, unformed, or ill-
informed; when the issues are emotionally charged and socially divisive?”  Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 801–02 (1980).  In the end, 
Professor Schulhofer concluded that the force of these arguments “seems to me insufficient 
to override the traditional virtues of exposure and accountability in the context of the current 
debate over sentencing reform,” although he found “it unnecessary to consider the more 
elusive question whether low visibility techniques, even if attractive on tactical grounds, are 
consistent with accepted principles of democratic government.”  Id. at 803, 806. 
80 See Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
133, 176–79. 
81 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the 
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2005). 
2012] PROSECUTORIAL DECRIMINALIZATION 801 
serving justice than serving a prosecutor’s self-interest, whether it be 
enhancing career prospects by amassing convictions and aggregate 
sentences—more “notches on the gun,” to use a phrase from Ed Meese’s 
keynote address—or simply lightening the caseload to avoid stress and 
overtime.
82
  As for the aforementioned deterrence argument, even the 
instrumentally minded among us might find unpalatable the exploitation of 
an unwitting citizenry for purposes of crime control.
83
  After all, no one 
likes being duped by the government.
84
 
V. OVERT DECRIMINALIZATION 
For these and other reasons, the secret law of prosecutorial 
decriminalization presents a crisis of legitimacy.  But what if the 
decisionmaking process was open and honest, not hidden from the general 
population and those individuals subject to its strictures?  Imagine an 
elected district attorney conveying to his constituency the rules or principles 
that will be used in exercising prosecutorial discretion, stating with a degree 
of specificity the conditions under which his office will not prosecute 
particular crimes or seek certain punishments.  This type of overt 
prosecutorial decriminalization might avoid the aforementioned problems 
associated with secrecy, and, conceivably, it could better serve some of the 
core values of the rule of law. 
Like the critique of overcriminalization, there is a scholarly pedigree to 
the idea of articulating the grounds for exercising prosecutorial discretion.  
“Would it not be a helpful addition,” Frank Remington asked a quarter 
century ago, “to try to specify those [criminal] provisions that should be 
fully enforced and those allowing discretion to enforce and, if discretion is 
allowed, indicate by whom that choice can be made and in accordance with 
what standards?”85 
 
82 See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Looking Back and at the Challenges Ahead, in 
THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 434. 
83 The practice also has an uncomfortable resemblance to the enforcement of England’s 
“bloody code” of the eighteenth century and the doctrine of crime by “analogy” in 
communist dictatorships, both of which sought to cow the masses into conformity.  See 
Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME 
AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17 (Allen Lane ed., 1975); Susan Finder, 
The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145, 208–10 
(1993). 
84 Then again, some people may prefer to adopt a “sausage theory” of criminal justice: 
they don’t want to know how law enforcement is using its discretion—how the sausage is 
made, so to speak—they just want low crime and safe streets.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 362–63 (1993). 
85 Frank J. Remington, The Future of the Substantive Criminal Law Codification 
Movement—Theoretical and Practical Concerns, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 867, 893 (1988). 
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Although some statutes should be fully enforced, an unthinking enforcement of other 
statutes will not add to the quality of law enforcement nor achieve the purpose the 
legislature had in enacting the statute.  In dealing with serious crime, crimes which 
routinely result in arrest, the most important decisions are made by the prosecutor. . . .  
What the substantive law-in-action is, largely depends what the prosecutor says it is.  
Yet insufficient attention has been given to this fact. . . .  Dealing with the issue is 
crucial to the achievement of a substantive criminal code, fair and effective both [on] 
the books and in practice.
86
 
Overt prosecutorial decriminalization has not been adopted in any 
comprehensive fashion, but there are examples that roughly comport with 
the idea. 
In June 2010, the new district attorney of Philadelphia, Seth Williams, 
launched the Small Amount of Marijuana (SAM) program.
87
  Pursuant to 
this initiative, arrests for possession of up to thirty grams of marijuana are 
no longer prosecuted as misdemeanors, which could result in up to thirty 
days incarceration, a $500 fine, and a permanent criminal record.
88
  Instead, 
low-level marijuana offenders in Philadelphia complete a three-hour drug-
abuse class, which costs them $200, and their records are expunged.  In the 
program’s first year, more than 4,000 cases were diverted out of the 
criminal justice system, saving millions of dollars that otherwise would 
have been consumed by legal actors in court proceedings.
89
  Interestingly, 
the SAM program was the product of a collaboration between the district 
attorney’s office and the state judiciary,90 both of which were seeking to 
reduce an overloaded criminal docket and its detrimental effects in more 
serious cases.
91
  In addition, it has been suggested that the program could 





86 Id. at 893–94. 
87 See William Bender, D.A.: Philly’s New Pot Policy Just Makes Sense . . . and Saves 
Dollars, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 8, 2011, at 6; see also Craig R. McCoy, Nancy Phillips & 
Dylan Purcell, Philadelphia Plans Fines for Use of Marijuana, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 5, 
2010, at A1; Peter Mucha, Marijuana Leniency Starts Today, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 8, 
2010), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special_packages/inquirer/courts-reform/201006
08_Marijuana_leniency_starts_today.html. 
88 See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-104(1)(vii) (2003); 204 PA. CODE § 303.15 (2008). 
89 Bender, supra note 87. 
90 Letters: Municipal Court Played a Big Role in Small Amount of Marijuana Program, 
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 3, 2011, at 18; McCoy et al., supra note 87. 
91 For instance, an investigative report had found that almost two-thirds of defendants in 
Philadelphia charged with violent crimes avoided conviction on all charges.  Craig R. 
McCoy, Nancy Phillips & Dylan Purcell, Justice: Delayed, Dismissed, Denied, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 2009, at A1. 
92 See McCoy et al., supra note 87 (noting this claim, given “Philadelphia police data 
show” that “[m]ore than 80 percent typically have been of African Americans”). 
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Although the prosecutor in charge of the SAM program apparently 
cringes at the word “decriminalization,”93 in reality it fits the foregoing 
definition of prosecutorial decriminalization.  By contrast, prosecutorial 
decriminalization of marijuana possession in Seattle, Washington, has been 
both unabashed and clearly supported by popular will.  Local voters 
approved a referendum in 2003 that made marijuana the lowest priority for 
law enforcement, but the then-city attorney continued to prosecute 
possession cases.
94
  In 2010, a new city attorney, Pete Holmes, came into 
office on a platform that included ending the prosecution of low-level 
marijuana possession.  So although it remains a crime under state law— 
possessing less than forty grams is a misdemeanor punishable by up to 
ninety days incarceration and a $1,000 fine
95—Seattle’s local prosecutor 
has decriminalized this conduct with the apparent support of his 
constituency. 
Another instance of prosecutorial decriminalization concerns the 
nation’s toughest anti-recidivist scheme.  Under California’s “three strikes” 
law, an individual previously convicted of two serious or violent felonies 
(as defined by statute) who then commits another felony faces a mandatory 
twenty-five-years-to-life sentence.
96
  The law’s most draconian feature is 
that the last “strike” can be any felony, including petty theft with a prior 
larceny conviction.  The resulting injustices have become embarrassing, 
even to some law-and-order proponents, with defendants receiving virtual 
life sentences for, among other things, stealing golf clubs and shoplifting 
videotapes.
97
  After taking office in 2000, Los Angeles District Attorney 
Steve Cooley became the first chief prosecutor in California to announce a 
written policy stating that a life sentence would not be sought when the 
defendant’s current crime is not a violent or serious felony.98  This special 
directive also provided guidelines for dismissing qualifying convictions in 
 
93 See Bender, supra note 87. 
94 See Emily Heffter, Seattle’s New City Attorney to Dismiss Cases of Pot Possession, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/
2010808085_marijuana16m.html; see also Pete Holmes, Washington State Should Lead on 
Marijuana Legalization, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/opinion/2014247491_guest17holmes.html. 
95 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.92.030, 69.50.4014 (2011). 
96 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (1998). 
97 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 
77 (2003).  Although his punishment was subsequently reduced, one defendant received a 
life sentence for stealing a piece of pizza.  See Jack Leonard, “Pizza Thief” Walks the Line, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A1. 
98 See L.A. COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, THREE STRIKES POLICY: SPECIAL 
DIRECTIVE (Dec. 19, 2000), http://da.co.la.ca.us/3strikes.htm [hereinafter L.A. THREE 
STRIKES POLICY]; see also Mandatory Sentencing in California: Cooley’s Law, ECONOMIST, 
July 31, 2010, at 24. 
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other cases.  “As prosecutors, it is our legal and ethical obligation to 
exercise this discretion in a manner that assures proportionality, 
evenhanded application, predictability and consistency,” the directive’s 
preamble points out.  “Proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion protects 
society and preserves confidence in and respect for the criminal justice 
system.”99  Toward this end, the preamble notes that the district attorney’s 
office will closely monitor the policy’s implementation and effects.100 
Prosecutorial decriminalization is not limited to adult defendants but 
also extends into the juvenile justice system.  The practice of “sexting”—
children sharing sexually explicit photos of themselves via cell phone or the 
internet—has become a widespread problem.101  Although juveniles might 
not appreciate that such behavior can be criminal under child pornography 
laws, and despite the fact that the offenders are properly seen as victims, 
too, a number of jurisdictions have witnessed teens being charged for 
sexting.
102
  But in light of “the unique characteristics and possible long term 
effects” of these cases, Mathias Heck, the prosecuting attorney in Dayton, 
Ohio, organized and implemented a program for teens accused of sexting 
that diverted them out of the justice system.
103
  Cases are screened for 
eligibility using factors that might indicate serious delinquency, such as the 
use of force or illegal substances to obtain the photos.  If eligible juveniles 
meet the program’s requirements (e.g., relinquishing their cell phones and 
performing community service), charges are not filed or are dismissed.  In 
this way, potential felonies under state law are removed from the system.
104
 
Overt prosecutorial decriminalization is susceptible to a variety of 
critiques,
105
 some intertwined with the arguments in favor of 
 
99 L.A. THREE STRIKES POLICY, supra note 98. 
100 See id. 
101 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to 
Teenagers’ Exchange of Self-Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 557 
(2010); Elizabeth M. Ryan, Note, Sexting: How the State Can Prevent a Moment of 
Indiscretion from Leading to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences for Minors and Young 
Adults, 96 IOWA L. REV. 357, 360 (2010); JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate 
Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951, 952 (2011). 
102 See, e.g., Sweeny, supra note 101, at 957–59; see also Stephen F. Smith, Jail for 
Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 
513 (2008). 
103 Mathias H. Heck, Sexting and Charging Juveniles?: Balancing the Law and Bad 
Choices, PROSECUTOR, Jan.–Mar. 2009, at 29. 
104 See id. 
105 For instance, in the federal system, overt prosecutorial decriminalization might be 
seen as violating the President’s responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Kevin S. Marshall, Free Enterprise and the Rule 
of Law: The Political Economy of Executive Discretion (Efficiency Implications of 
Regulatory Enforcement Strategies), 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 235, 239 n.11 (2010) 
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overcriminalization and low-visibility discretionary decisionmaking.
106
  The 
above examples also raise practical considerations.  As discussed, chief 
prosecutors are enormously powerful officials, but they are still political 
actors whose decisions can be condemned by bitter opponents and 
undermined by other actors in the criminal justice system.  When Seth 
Williams announced the SAM program, the previous Philadelphia District 
Attorney, Lynn Abraham, ridiculed his decision: “‘Welcome to 
Philadelphia, Light Up a Joint’ may just be our new slogan,” she gibed. 
“Local gangs and marijuana growers everywhere are positively 
overjoyed.”107  Likewise, the Philadelphia Police Department initially 
appeared less than thrilled about the new program, with a police spokesman 
asserting that officers would continue to stop and arrest individuals for 
marijuana possession: “Whether or not they make it through the charging 
process, that’s up to the D.A.”108 
Prosecutorial decriminalization can also generate questions of 
consistency—temporal, geographical, and topical.  Consider L.A. District 
Attorney Steve Cooley’s policy for enforcing the three strikes law.  
Between 2000 and 2007, his office dismissed strikes in more than 70% of 
the cases where defendants were eligible for enhanced sentences under the 
recidivist statute.
109
  But this policy could not help the 1,700 or so inmates 
who received life sentences under Cooley’s predecessor.110  Nor does it 
change the approach taken by district attorneys in other California 
jurisdictions, including those adjacent to Los Angeles where prosecutors 
pursue life sentences in every eligible case.
111
  Nor does an instance of overt 
 
(noting similar duties on state governors).  To be sure, executive officials may have no 
authority to refuse to perform “ministerial” duties mandated by legislation.  See, e.g., 
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 595 (1838); Louis Fisher, Signing Statements: 
Constitutional and Practical Limits, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 183, 184–86 (2007).  But 
faithful execution of criminal law should not be confused with the idea of full enforcement, 
that is, officials must investigate all known or knowable offenses within their jurisdiction 
and then prosecute them to the maximum extent allowed by law.  This notion has long been 
recognized to be a myth—one which has only become more ridiculous with each new act of 
overcriminalization.  See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 6, at 286; Kadish, supra note 1, at 907; 
see also DAVIS, supra note 34, at 165. 
106 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
107 Mucha, supra note 87; see also McCoy et al., supra note 87. 
108 McCoy et al., supra note 87 (quoting police spokesman). 
109 See Michael Romano, Divining the Spirit of California’s Three Strikes Law, 22 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 171, 173 (2010). 
110 See Michael Romano, Striking Back: Using Death Penalty Cases to Fight 
Disproportionate Sentences Imposed Under California’s Three Strikes Law, 21 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 311, 330 n.88 (2010). 
111 Romano, supra note 109, at 173.  As this article was going to press, California voters 
adopted a ballot initiative modifying the state’s three strikes law to require a life sentence 
only when a defendant’s current conviction is for a violent or serious offense.  The change 
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decriminalization mean that a prosecutor will advocate similar policies 
elsewhere or oppose overcriminalization more generally.  For example, 
District Attorney Cooley has been an outspoken opponent of medical 
marijuana and threatened to ignore any contrary municipal laws;
112
 he also 
helped pen the argument against Proposition 19, the 2010 California ballot 
initiative that would have legalized marijuana possession by adults.
113
 
Such differences are not inherently condemnable, however.  In fact, 
variances in policy, across jurisdictions and among subjects, can be seen as 
beneficial under theories of federalism and localism.  In a pluralistic 
society, citizens in different communities are likely to have distinct views 
on the substance and procedure of criminal justice.  The closer a 
government is to its constituents and the greater the opportunity for citizens 
to be involved in the decisionmaking process, the more likely that any given 
policy choice will be attuned to community preferences.
114
  Counties and 
cities might even become laboratories of experimentation in criminal 
justice.
115
  If nothing else, citizens can vote with their feet (assuming they 
are not shackled), travelling to a different community that adopts policies 
more in line with their individual preferences.
116
  If someone dislikes the 
acts of prosecutorial decriminalization by Messrs. Williams, Holmes, 
Cooley, or Heck, their opportunities to lobby for change or relocate 
elsewhere are far greater than if the decisions had been made at the state or 
national level. 
VI. PROSECUTORIAL DECRIMINALIZATION ABROAD 
Comparisons between the United States and Europe can be 
enlightening for myriad reasons, not least of which are the marked 
differences on the other side of the Atlantic.  The most disturbing 
manifestations of overcriminalization, especially the sheer breadth of penal 
 
also authorizes resentencing for inmates currently serving life sentences if their third strike 
conviction was not for a serious or violent offense.  See, e.g., Marisa Lagos & Ellen Huet, 
‘Three strikes’ law changes approved by wide margin, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2012, at A14. 
112 See, e.g., John Hoeffel, D.A. Chides L.A. Council, Says He’ll Target Pot Stores, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at A1. 
113 See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 19, at 16–17 (2010), 
available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdf/english/19-arg-rebuttals.pdf. 
114 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1484, 1510 (1987). 
115 Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
116 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, 28 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 202 (2011). 
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codes, are largely unheard of in European systems.
117
  Indeed, at the same 
time that scholars of domestic criminal law were decrying 
overcriminalization, leading comparativists were advocating the 
examination of continental criminal justice to help America evolve “beyond 
the Neanderthal stage.”118  The most prominent debate in this area 
concerned the civil law principle of legality (mandatory prosecution), which 
was forwarded by several distinguished academics as a means to tame 
prosecutorial discretion in the United States.
119
 
However, recent works have demonstrated that European prosecutors, 
like their American counterparts, are extremely powerful and possess more 
discretion than previously thought possible.
120
  What is more, this discretion 
is being exercised in response to a common problem on both continents: too 
 
117 See Fernando Molina, A Comparison Between Continental European and Anglo-
American Approaches to Overcriminalization and Some Remarks on How to Deal with It, 14 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 123, 127 (2011).  Dean Molina states: 
When I received the invitation to participate in a symposium about overcriminalization, my first 
thought was that this presented me with an excellent opportunity to share, with foreign 
colleagues, concerns about a common problem.  However, after reading a provocative article by 
Erik Luna about the overcriminalization phenomenon, especially his amazing catalogue of 
actions that are considered criminal in the United States, I began to doubt whether, despite 
talking about the same topic, we are really talking about the same problem. . . .  After reading 
Douglas Husak’s book on overcriminalization in Anglo-American law, the suspicions that 
Luna’s article aroused in me were confirmed.  Undoubtedly, most of the overcriminalization 
questions that arise in the United States are completely unknown to us.  They are not a cause of 
concern to us not because we haven’t thought about them, but because we have already solved 
those problems. 
Id. at 123–24.  But cf. VOLKER KREY & OLIVER WINDGÄTTER, RECHTSPOLITISCHES F. [LEGAL 
POL’Y F.], THE UNTENABLE SITUATION OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW: AGAINST QUANTITATIVE 
OVERLOADING, QUALITATIVE OVERCHARGING AND THE OVEREXPANSION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE  58 (2012). 
118 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing 
Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 374 (1977); see also Richard S. Frase, 
Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do 
It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 543 (1990); 
Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American 
Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 317 
(1995); Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Lessons of Comparative Criminal Procedure, 15 AM. U. L. 
REV. 341, 348 (1966). 
119 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 34; LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1977); John 
H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 
(1974).  Compare Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision 
in Three “Inquisitorial” Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J 240 (1977), with 
John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: “Myth” and 
Reality, 87 YALE L.J 1549 (1978). 
120 See JÖRG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS EUROPE (2005); THE 
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57; Luna & Wade, supra note 38, 
at 1428. 
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many cases and not enough time and resources.  As it turns out, European 
prosecutors have dealt with their overloaded systems by effectively 
adjudicating cases and decriminalizing conduct.  Sometimes this is done in 
an obscure fashion, posing the type of legitimacy issues facing American 
prosecution; but at other times and in other places, such discretionary 
decisionmaking is exercised openly and honestly.  Here, I will briefly 
mention two examples of overt decriminalization, one from the Netherlands 
and the other from England.  Like the United States, these nations have 
traditionally recognized prosecutorial discretion (also known as the 
principle of opportunity). 
The comparison raises intriguing questions and possibilities, as well as 
some potential pitfalls.  For instance, although Dutch prosecutors are 
hierarchically subordinate to a cabinet-level executive (the Minister of 
Justice), they are officially members of the judiciary and perceive their duty 
as a magisterial one, which requires non-partisan truth-seeking in the 
tradition of continental law.
121
  Even members of the Crown Prosecution 
Service, practicing in the birthplace of adversarial adjudication, are not 
nearly as partisan in their mindset as prosecutors (and defense counsel) 
operating in America’s distinctively combative criminal process.122  Despite 
these and other important differences, however, prosecutors in the United 
States and Europe are relatively comparable—not apples and oranges, so to 
speak, but different types of apples—where the two groups have parallel 
roles, powers, and impacts on individuals and society as a whole. 
The first foreign example involves rules for marijuana cases in the 
Netherlands, which more than any other nation uses guidelines to inform 
the decisions not only of prosecutors, but also those of police, judges, and, 
most importantly, the public.
123
  When the topic of marijuana in the 
Netherlands comes up, Americans almost invariably assume that the 
country’s legislature has decriminalized drug sales, thereby allowing the 
existence of Amsterdam’s famous “coffee shops.”  In truth, the use, 
possession, and distribution of marijuana is illegal by statute,
124
 but the 
 
121 See, e.g., Peter J.P. Tak, The Dutch Prosecutor: A Prosecuting and Sentencing 
Officer, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 135, 135–
36. 
122 See, e.g., Chris Lewis, The Evolving Role of the English Crown Prosecution Service, 
in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 214; Luna & Wade, 
supra note 57, at 439. 
123 See, e.g., Tak, supra note 121, at 139, 144–46. 
124 See Opium Act (Opiumwet), Stb. 1976, art. 2, available at 
http://www.cannabisbureau.nl/en/doc/pdf/Dutch%20Opium_Act_30556.pdf; see also Why 
Are Coffee Shops Allowed?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/
english/verzamel/frequently_asked/why_are_coffee_shops/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2012) 
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Dutch Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie) has issued rules as 
to when a case will or will not be prosecuted.
125
  The main features of law 
enforcement policy and its application to drugs are summarized as follows: 
The discretionary principle is an important factor in Dutch criminal law.  It allows the 
Public Prosecution Service to waive criminal proceedings in the public interest.  Law 
enforcement policy gives a high priority to large-scale trafficking in all kinds of drugs 
and dealing in hard drugs.  Sale and possession of cannabis for personal use are much 
lower priorities.  Details of these priorities are published in official guidelines.  Dutch 
policy on law enforcement is therefore more explicit than in some other countries, 
which operate along the same lines in practice.
126
 
Specifically, coffee shop owners may stock up to 500 grams of 
marijuana and will not be prosecuted for selling the drug, so long as: (1) 
they do not sell more than five grams per customer per day; (2) they do not 
sell “hard” drugs; (3) they do not advertise drugs; (4) they ensure that their 
shop and patrons do not cause a nuisance in the vicinity; and (5) they do not 
sell marijuana to persons under the age of eighteen or allow them on the 
premises.
127
  If these rules are not observed, the coffee shop can be closed 
down and the proprietors are liable to be prosecuted.
128
  Moreover, Dutch 
municipalities may apply different rules, including rejecting coffee shops in 
their jurisdiction, limiting the number of shops, or placing further 
restrictions on the amount of marijuana that may be stocked.
129
  The 
guidelines thus represent an important model of overt prosecutorial 
 
(noting that “possession and sale of small quantities of cannabis in coffee shops are offences 
under the Opium Act”). 
125 See What Are the Rules Governing Coffee Shops, and How Are They Enforced?, 
OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_
asked/what_are_the_rules/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Rules Governing Coffee 
Shops]; see also Robert J. MacCoun, What Can We Learn From the Dutch Cannabis 
Coffeeshop System?, 106 ADDICTION 1899, 1900 (2011); NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFF., FAQ DRUGS: A GUIDE TO DUTCH POLICY (2008), available at 
http://www.minbuza.nl/en/appendices/you-and-the-netherlands/about-the-netherlands/
ethical-issues/faq-drugs.html; Frequently Asked Questions About the Dutch Drugs Policy, 
OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/frequently_asked/ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
126 What Are the Main Features of Dutch Policy on Law Enforcement?, OPENBAAR 
MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/what_
are_the_main/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
127 Rules Governing Coffee Shops, supra note 125. 
128 Id. 
129 See id.; Do Different Municipalities Apply Different Rules?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, 
http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/do_different/ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012); Why Are Fewer Coffee Shops Operating?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, 
http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/why_are_fewer_
coffee/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
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decriminalization, struck at the national level but still allowing substantial 
local decisionmaking as to the community impact. 
The second foreign example concerns the rules issued by the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) for prosecuting assisted-suicide cases.
130
  Under 
British law, suicide is legal but assisting in suicide is a specific offense 
punishable by up to fourteen years’ imprisonment.131  Although assisted 
suicide was rarely prosecuted, cases denominated as “mercy killings” had 
been pursued.
132
  The issue was further complicated by so-called suicide 
tourism, where individuals might aid the terminally ill in travelling to other 
countries that have decriminalized euthanasia.
133
  In the 2009 Purdy case, 
the British House of Lords took up a challenge to assisted-suicide 
prosecutions based on the European Convention on Human Rights.
134
  In 
particular, Article 8 of the European Convention provides that any 
restrictions on the right to private life must be “in accordance with the 
law,”135 where law has been interpreted to include sub-statutory and 
unwritten rules of enforcement.
136
 
According to the British Law Lords, the legal rules must be 
“sufficiently accessible to the individual who is affected by the restriction, 
and sufficiently precise to enable him to understand its scope and foresee 
the consequences of his actions so that he can regulate his conduct without 
breaking the law.”137  In this context, the terminally ill appellant was 
seeking information “so that she can take a decision that affects her private 
life” and “make an informed decision as to whether or not to ask for her 
husband’s assistance” without exposing him to the risk of prosecution.138  
Because the existing statutory law did not provide this information and the 
requisite level of foreseeability, the court’s opinion called upon the Director 
 
130 For an in-depth discussion of the Crown Prosecution Service, see Lewis, supra note 
122. 
131 Suicide Act, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, §§ 1, 2 (1961) (Eng. & Wales). 
132 See, e.g., Colin Fernandez, Devoted Mother Kay Gilderdale Charged with Attempted 
Murder of Paralysed Daughter Who Was Bed-Riden for 17 Years, DAILY MAIL ONLINE 
(U.K.) (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1170522/Kay-Gilderdale-
charged-attempted-murder-paralysed-daughter.html. 
133 See, e.g., Alison Langley, ‘Suicide Tourists’ Go to the Swiss for Help in Dying, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at A3; More Britons Seeking Suicide Help, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7732640.stm. 
134 See R. (Purdy) v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [2010] 1 A.C. 345 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
135 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
136 See Purdy, [2010] 1 A.C., at ¶ 41 (Lord Hope). 
137 Id. at ¶ 40. 
138 Id. at ¶¶ 30–31. 
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of Public Prosecutions “to clarify what his position is as to the factors that 
he regards as relevant for and against prosecution.”139 
After the decision was announced, the CPS circulated draft guidelines, 
received public input, and then issued a synopsis of the relevant law and a 
set of factors in prosecuting an assisted-suicide case, such as whether the 
victim was under the age of eighteen, whether the suspect had a history of 
violence or abuse of the victim, and whether the suspect had been paid to 
assist in the suicide.
140
  Embedded in the guidelines is a disclaimer that 
“[t]his policy does not in any way ‘decriminalise’ the offense of 
encouraging or assisting suicide.”141  But as one leading scholar wrote, “the 
main significance of [the Purdy] case is that it marks a step along the road 
towards making assisted suicide legal,”142 and by decreasing the potential 
scope of British statutory law, the CPS had effectively decriminalized 
conduct that might otherwise be subject to prosecution.
143
 
This prototype of a new “third arm of Anglo-Saxon Law”144 illustrates 
the prospects for a dialogic process in prosecutorial decriminalization.  
Here, the Law Lords prodded the CPS to institute a policy regarding 
assisted suicide, which it did by promulgating rules amounting to 
prosecutorial decriminalization.  On this side of the Atlantic, American 
jurists and scholars have argued for greater dialogue between the judicial 
and political branches, with some U.S. Supreme Court decisions essentially 
 
139 Id. at ¶ 55; see also id. at ¶¶ 16 (Lord Phillips), 64 (Baroness Hale), 84–86 (Lord 
Brown), 99–102 (Lord Neuberger). 
140 See DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., POLICY FOR 
PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF ENCOURAGING OR ASSISTING SUICIDE (2010), 
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.pdf; 
see also DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., INTERIM POLICY FOR 
PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE (2009) [hereinafter INTERIM POLICY 
FOR PROSECUTORS], available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_consultation.pdf; 
DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., PUBLIC CONSULTATION EXERCISE 
ON THE INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE (2010), 
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_responses.pdf.  However, it has been 
argued that the guidelines still have not produced sufficient legal clarity.  See, e.g., COMM’N 
ON ASSISTED DYING, FINAL REPORT: THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF ASSISTED DYING IS 
INADEQUATE & INCOHERENT  23 (2011), available at http://www.demos.co.uk/files/
476_CoAD_FinalReport_158x240_I_web_single-NEW_.pdf?1328113363. 
141 DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 140, at 
¶ 6. 
142 J.R. Spencer, Assisted Suicide and the Discretion to Prosecute, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
493, 495 (2009). 
143 See also COMM’N ON ASSISTED DYING, supra note 140, at 299 (noting that “[t]here is 
now a broad public perception that assisted suicides that meet the criteria stipulated in the 
DPP policy are effectively decriminalised”). 
144 Lewis, supra note 122, at 220. 
812 ERIK LUNA [Vol. 102 
pursuing such interaction.
145
  In the present context, the aforementioned 
SAM program offers a small-scale example of interbranch dialogue in 
prosecutorial decriminalization: Philadelphia’s district attorney sought input 
from the state judiciary on the basic idea and then worked with the courts to 
bring the program to fruition.
146
 
With overt decriminalization, another type of dialogue may be 
important as well—that between the officials formulating the policy and 
parties with an interest in the end product.  As noted, the CPS sought public 
feedback on its proposed rules.  After publishing an interim policy in 
September 2009, the CPS initiated a twelve-week process of public 
consultation, which resulted in over 4,800 responses from individuals and 
organizations, including public health professionals, representatives of 
religious groups, scholars, public servants, and legal and political actors.  
These views were taken into account in making adjustments to the final 
published policy.
147
  In the United States, administrative law provides a 
wealth of experience on the rulemaking processes of executive agencies, 
where the legitimacy of a given policy “depends in no small part upon the 
openness, accessibility, and amenability of these officials to the needs and 
ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority derives, and upon 
whom their commands must fall.”148  Although an APA-style system might 
be unnecessary,
149
 the general lessons of American administrative law and 
the experiences of prosecution offices, both at home and abroad, could 
inform a thoughtful interactive process for formulating a policy of 
prosecutorial decriminalization. 
Presumably, the decision to undertake such a process would be 
premised on the belief that a particular offense constitutes 
overcriminalization and thus provides an appropriate target for prosecutorial 
decriminalization.  As noted earlier, this judgment may depend on whether 
the crime is deficient in harmful wrongdoing;
150
 and on this issue, there 
 
145 See Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125, 1126 
(2000). 
146 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
147 See Lewis, supra note 122, at 224; DPP’s Introductory Remarks on Assisted Suicide 
Policy, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/
dpps_introductory_remarks_on_assisted_suicide_policy/. 
148 Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400–01 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
149 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2006); see also Erik Luna, 
Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 590–623 (2000). 
150 The issue is sufficiently clear to me from my own worldview, which holds that the 
fundamental unit of moral analysis is the individual, who possesses a right of self-ownership 
and the freedom to engage generally in capitalist acts with other consenting adults.  See 
Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 732–39.  But I recognize that 
many (perhaps most) Americans will disagree with this philosophy or its applications. 
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appears to be a consensus in a number of areas of overcriminalization, as 
evidenced by the bunking of otherwise strange bedfellows.
151
  With some 
topics, however, the prospect of agreement seems remote.  Consider, for 
instance, insider trading: Although a respectable argument can be made that 
it should be no crime at all, neither legislative nor prosecutorial 
decriminalization of insider trading has any chance in the current political 
environment.
152
  Consider also one of Professor Kadish’s original examples 
of overcriminalization—abortion.153  Although the issue has been 
constitutionalized by the Supreme Court, it is hard to believe a consensus 
could be reached today that abortion lacks harmful wrongdoing.
154
 
The United States is hardly the only nation that struggles with 
normative issues of criminalization and decriminalization.  At the time the 
Law Lords decided Purdy, “it was clear that the [British] government did 
not want to amend the law on assisted suicide due to its high public 
sensitivity.”155  Since then, the case has generated voluminous debate, 
including disagreement among intellectual heavyweights.
156
  For present 
purposes, however, the pertinent question is whether it was advisable for 
the Law Lords to require the Director of Public Prosecutions to announce 
guidelines for bringing charges of assisted suicide, using Purdy as a means 
to prompt an act of prosecutorial decriminalization.  On this issue, one 
scholar made a strong case for the prior opacity in discretionary 
decisionmaking: 
[A]ssisted suicide is a rare case.  More particularly, it is a case where the real harm 
sought to be avoided (advantage-taking, social pressure to die, and undervaluing the 
lives of the terminally ill) is engendered by the formal permissibility of the act far 
more than many instances of the act itself.  Should the escorting of loved ones to 
suicide clinics continue to take place under the radar, the threat of normalizing 
controlled death and the danger of its abuse would not loom half as large as it does 
against a background of open acceptance of that same practice.  More certainly, by 
continuing to hold out even an empty threat of censure, the law would not be forced 
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Cato Institute, the Federalist Society, the Heritage Foundation, the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Washington Legal Foundation.  See Fields & 
Emshwiller, supra note 12, at A10; Liptak, supra note 12, at A1. 
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POL’Y 239, 240 (2008). 
153 Kadish, Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 6, at 162–63. 
154 I take no position here on this controversy. 
155 Lewis, supra note 122, at 224. 
156 Compare John Finnis, The Lords’ Eerie Swansong: A Note on R (Purdy) v. Director 
of Public Prosecutions (Oxford, Legal Research Paper No. 31/2009 & Notre Dame Law 
School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-39, 2009), with Jeremy Waldron, Torture, 
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into the undesirable position of classifying some but not other lives as potentially 
worthless.  In light of this, it is my view that the hitherto unofficial policy of non-
prosecution was the correct—indeed, the only viable—answer . . . .
157
 
The point is well taken.  In some areas, an act of overcriminalization 
may cover few cases, which are rarely if ever prosecuted, whereas the 
potential negative consequences of overt decriminalization may be so 
momentous that one might prefer a low-visibility act of discretionary mercy 
to deal with each incident as it arises.  Interestingly, the Netherlands has its 
own history of struggling with problems of criminalization and 
decriminalization, not only with provocative subjects such as abortion and 
euthanasia, but also with regard to topics that seem considerably less 
controversial.
158
  For example, the Dutch Cabinet pronounced a new policy 
that would transform coffee shops into private clubs for the local market 
only, with the goal of stemming drug tourism by foreigners.
159
  Robert 
MacCoun described the change as startling, “because Dutch officials have 
long resisted international pressure, standing by the coffeeshop model as an 
expression of Dutch gedoogcultuur (‘culture of permissiveness’) and as a 
pragmatic ‘least worst’ solution.”160 
In general, however, the Netherlands has approached criminal justice 
with a high degree of openness and an acceptance of what might appear 
contradictory from afar.
161
  The Dutch legal culture recognizes that statutory 
language may be inattentive to the practical necessities of implementation.  
Deviations from an otherwise strict legislative text are filled by the concept 
of beleid (policy), which achieves a “quasi-legislative” status when 
expressed in guidelines, notes Dutch law professor Erhard Blankenburg.
162
 
In Dutch understanding penal law is a goal oriented program authorizing the 
authorities to punish undesired behavior.  Prosecution is empowered to charge, not 
required to do so.  At the same time, however, the decision not to prosecute cannot be 
taken at will: equal treatment under the law, the rules of nondiscrimination, and the 
principle of predictability of legal action require police prosecutors to follow rules as 
 
157 Kate Greasley, R(Purdy) v DPP and the Case for Wilful Blindness, 30 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 301, 323–24 (2010). 
158 Erhard Blankenburg, Beleid—A Very Dutch Legal Term, 41 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & 
UNOFFICIAL L. 65, 67–70 (1998). 
159 See The Dutch Cabinet: Coffeeshop to Be a Private Club for the Local Market, 
MINISTRY OF SEC. AND JUSTICE (May 27, 2011), http://www.government.nl/documents-and-
publications/press-releases/2011/05/27/the-dutch-cabinet-coffeeshop-to-be-a-private-club-
for-the-local-market.html; see also David Jolly, Hague Court Clears Way for Dutch to Bar 
Nonresidents From Buying Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2012, at A4 (discussing court 
ruling upholding new policy, which took effect in the southern provinces on May 1, 2012, 
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to when they apply their penal powers.  Thus internal rule making has to supplement 
the legislative rule.  Advocates may challenge the prosecutors’ decisions on the basis 
of precedents and demand publication of the internal guidelines which legitimize 
them.  The pure theory of beleid requires every making of a rule to be based on 




Once formulated, beleid can be debated in local political arenas, such 
as city councils and so-called triangular conferences.  During these 
conferences, the mayor, chief prosecutor, police chief, and oftentimes 
interested individuals and groups meet to discuss criminal justice policy for 
their community, as well as to coordinate with regional and national 
policymakers.
164
  Moreover, beleid in guideline form provides a benchmark 
by which to evaluate the performance of government officials, including 
police and prosecutors.  As such, beleid does not permit the government “to 
close its eyes to deviations, but forces it to issue explicit guidelines within 
which toleration is handled.”165  The guidelines and their application are 
then open to political and judicial scrutiny as to whether the deviations from 
statutory law are justified by standard pragmatic rationales. 
Of course, a divergence between the law on the books and the law as 
enforced is not unique to the Netherlands. All legal cultures tolerate some 
deviations from strict rules; the only question is the approach taken toward 
the resulting divide.  Some legal cultures will simply ignore a gulf between 
formal law and its enforcement, and others will deal with any contradictions 
on a case-by-case basis.  Both approaches require low-visibility exercises of 
discretion to cope with overloaded criminal justice systems.  By contrast, 
“pragmatic legal cultures ask for the explication of a policy line (beleid) 
along which toleration is handled.”166  In their daily lives, the Dutch are 
known for their open curtains,
167
 both literal and figurative, and this 
openness carries over to public affairs, as evidenced by overt 
decriminalization through prosecutorial guidelines. 
VII. CONCLUSION (AND A CAUTIONARY TALE) 
If I had my druthers, the American phenomenon of overcriminalization 
would be dealt with legislatively, not by executive action.  But in an 
overcriminalized world, created by unrepentant lawmakers and tolerated by 
 
163 Id. at 70. 
164 See id. at 72. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (citation omitted). 
167 See, e.g., Galina Vromen, A Habit Steeped in History, REUTERS, May 30, 1991, 
available at http://1.next.westlaw.com (in Reuters News database, enter search: 
advanced:TI(“habit steeped in history”)) (discussing Dutch “open curtain culture”). 
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deferential judges, there are simply too many cases and not enough 
resources to try them all.  Prosecutors are already decriminalizing conduct 
through their discretionary decisionmaking, and, as I said, they have no 
other choice but to do so.  Accepting this as a given, the basic issue is 
whether prosecutorial decriminalization should remain veiled and ad hoc, 
generating a secret administrative law of criminal justice; or whether 
instead prosecutorial decriminalization should be overt, promulgated in a 
principled fashion, so that both law enforcement and the public know where 
the line stands between what is criminal and what is not.  For now, I will 
take the latter—prosecutorial decriminalization as a public covenant—
guiding law enforcement, communicating honestly with the citizenry, and 
allowing individuals to conform their behavior to the effective scope of the 
law. 
This approach is more consistent with the rule of law, at least where 
that much-debated concept is predicated on the values of procedural justice 
rather than the myth of full enforcement.  Overt prosecutorial 
decriminalization might even serve the principles that sometimes animate 
the rule of law.  It acknowledges the important role played by the executive 
in a system of separated and coequal branches, where prosecutors are not 
simply clerical workers but have a distinct constitutional role.  Overt 
prosecutorial decriminalization is also consistent with the core value of 
federalism, the idea that criminal law enforcement should be local to the 
maximum extent possible, because government closer to the people is more 
likely to serve the needs of a particular jurisdiction.  Most of all, overt 
prosecutorial decriminalization increases transparency, allowing the public 
to see into the black box that is the criminal justice system. 
With that said, a word of caution is in order: As unbelievable as it 
sounds, American prosecutors are not bound by their own rules.  In 1979, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that law enforcement’s violation of agency 
regulations did not provide a basis for evidentiary exclusion.
168
  Because it 
is up to the executive branch to formulate such rules, making them litigable 
in criminal cases might result in “fewer and less protective regulations” (or 
so the Court argued).
169
  Since then, the lower courts have uniformly 
rejected legal claims based on federal prosecutors failing to abide by 
guidelines issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ).
170
  What makes this 
particularly galling is the fact that the DOJ has invoked its own guidelines 
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in congressional hearings as a reason why new statutory restrictions would 
be unnecessary.
171
  Most recently, it argued that a federal statute should be 
upheld because of the DOJ’s tighter construction of the law and the promise 




Unless a prosecution office is willing to police itself, overt 
prosecutorial decriminalization can set a trap for the legally untutored.  A 
perfect example is provided by the ongoing saga of medical marijuana.  To 
date, eighteen states have decriminalized the medicinal use of the drug, with 
laws defining eligibility and allowing some means of patient access (i.e., 
home cultivation, dispensaries, or both).
173
  However, the federal Controlled 
Substances Act still lists marijuana as having “no currently accepted 
medical use in treatment,”174 at least for purposes of the U.S. Code, and thus 
suppliers of the drug are amenable to federal prosecution without 
exception.
175
  Although the Bush Administration had engaged in an 
aggressive enforcement strategy regarding medical marijuana, then-Senator 
Obama promised to stop the raids on growers and dispensaries when he 
became America’s chief executive.176  Shortly after the new administration 
took office, a White House spokesman reiterated President Obama’s 
position that “federal resources should not be used to circumvent state 
laws” concerning medical marijuana.177  The new U.S. Attorney General, 
Eric Holder, also made clear that federal law enforcement policy would not 
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In October 2009, Holder’s chief lieutenant, David Ogden, issued a 
memorandum emphasizing that federal prosecution must be efficient and 
rational in the use of limited investigative and prosecutorial resources.
179
  
U.S. Attorneys were instructed that the general rule should be non-
prosecution of “individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous 
compliance with existing state laws that provide for medical use of 
marijuana.”180  To help distinguish legitimate medical marijuana activity 
from illegal drug trafficking, the memo set out several factors that might 
indicate a federal interest in prosecution, such as unlawful possession or use 
of firearms, the presence of violence, sales to minors, and ties between 
marijuana and other criminal enterprises.
181
  The document concluded by 
stating that it does not “legalize” marijuana—but if it were abided by, the 
Ogden Memo would be a form of prosecutorial decriminalization of 
marijuana used for medical purposes under state law.  And that is precisely 
how some medical marijuana providers and state government officials 




An entirely different message would be sent in the coming months and 
years, however, one backed by the full force of the U.S. Code.  Federal law 
enforcement began cracking down on medical marijuana dispensaries, 
prosecuting the proprietors and seeking forfeiture of business properties.
183
  
When Washington was considering legislation to license marijuana growers 
and dispensaries, the state’s two U.S. Attorneys threatened to prosecute 
“vigorously” those who participate in the manufacture and distribution of 
marijuana, “even if such activities are permitted under state law.”184  
Ominously, they claimed that “state employees who conducted activities 
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mandated by the Washington legislative proposals would not be immune 
from liability under” federal drug law.185   
Recently, a federal district court pointed to the Ogden Memo’s 
disclaimers as proof that a “reasonable person . . . could not conclude that 
the federal government was somehow authorizing the production and 
consumption of marijuana for medical purposes.”186  Indeed, the crackdown 
might be squared with a tight reading of the Ogden Memo, at least when 
supplemented by a subsequent DOJ memorandum.
187
  But for many people, 
the change had the feel of a bait-and-switch with penal consequences.
188
  
Overcriminalization is bad, but the perceived failure of law enforcement to 
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